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DISSECTING AXES OF




A noted criminal trial of defendant Richard Lee Bednarski in
Dallas, Texas, serves as a compelling example of the vulnerability of
gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender individuals in the judicial
system. In this case, a judge imposed a lenient sentence upon a
defendant who was convicted of murdering two gay men. Although
the criminal "justice" system in Texas is among the harshest in the
nation,' the judge offered the following explanation: "I put
prostitutes and gays at about the same level, and I'd be hard put to
give somebody life for killing a prostitute."2 The judge further stated
that "had (the victims) not been out there trying to spread AIDS,
they'd still be alive today,"3 and that " [t]hese two guys that got killed
Visiting Associate Professor, Washington College of Law, American University.
Associate Professor, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Yale University. This Essay was delivered as the Keynote
Address at the Symposium, Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias
and Its Implications Within the Legal System held at the Washington College of Law,
American University. I am thankful to all the participants at the conference who
offered input. I am especially thankful to the members of the American University
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law and the American University Law Review who
invited me to participate in the symposium.
1. See Andrew Hammel, Discrimination and Death in Dallas: A Case Study in
Systematic Racial Exclusion, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 187, 227 n.336 (1998) (citing
numerous sources analyzing harshness of the Texas criminal justice system, which is
attributable, among other reasons, to the state's system of elected judgeships); see also
Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison
Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 77 n.21 (1999)
(examining numerous statistical factors and indicating that the criminal system in
Texas is the "toughest" in the country).
2. Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of Two Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1988, at A8.
3. Larry Rowe, Gays Discouraged by Report Clearing Dallas Judge of Bias, DAILY
TEXAN (Univ. of Texas-Austin), Nov. 2, 1989, at 8 (altered text in original).
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wouldn't have been killed if they hadn't been cruising the streets
picking up teen-age boys,"' 4 and "I don't care much for queers
cruising the streets. I've got a teen-age boy."' The judge made these
statements despite the fact that the record did not contain conclusive
evidence that the victims were killed while seeking sexual contact and
despite witness testimony that the assailant and his friends "had set
out to harass homosexuals and entered the victims' car with the
intent of beating them."6  An investigation by the Texas State
Commission on Judicial Conduct cleared the judge of any
wrongdoing in the case.' Yet, the judge's comments powerfully
illuminate the problem that this symposium seeks to analyze -
judicial bias against gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender
individuals.
I view the problem of judicial bias as a structural matter, rather
than as a collection of isolated or atomistic incidents by wayward
judges.8 In other words, judicial bias is an institutional phenomenon
that affects all persons of marginalized backgrounds.9 This problem is
thus sustained by and related to broader social systems of domination
along lines of race, class, gender and sexuality. In the Dallas case, for
example, the judge's comments implicate sexuality, class, and gender
hierarchy: the judge marginalized the lives of gay men, lesbians, and
poor women (or "prostitutes").
Accordingly, this Essay urges scholars in the field of law and
sexuality to conduct a structural analysis of judicial bias. This Essay
addresses two important issues related to the task of unveiling and
challenging the institutional nature of anti-gay bias. In Part II, this
Essay explains in greater detail how a structural analysis of judicial
bias can lead to a richer understanding of subordination by
uncovering the subtle, hidden, and ideological roots and
4. Lisa Belkin, Report Clears Judge of Bias in Remarks About Homosexuals, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1989, at A25.
5. See Belkin, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. See Belkin, supra note 4.
8. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, " Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites7.:" Race, Sexual
Identity and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1378-88 (2000)
[hereinafter Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites?"] (discussing the unequal
treatment of gays and lesbians in the judicial system); see also Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and
Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 602 (1997) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen] (arguing that negative stereotypes of homosexuals impact judicial decision
making).
9. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1717 (2000) (noting, for
instance, that racism is a structural failure of the judicial process).
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manifestations of oppression. Part III argues that law and sexuality
scholars must conduct a multidimensional reading of judicial
heterosexism- that is, in order to appreciate fully the structural
dimensions of judicial bias against gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender individuals, we must recognize that this bias exists as part
of a larger system of domination along race, gender, and class lines.
I. "HOMOPHOBIA" VS. "HETEROSEXISM": MORE THAN A QUESTION
OF TERMINOLOGY
The first matter I wish to attend involves the "naming" of this
symposium: "Homophobia in the Halls of Justice." This portion of
my Essay seeks to complicate that terminology. When I think of
homophobia, I envision a very emotional, angry, frightened, and
perhaps violent reaction to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
people."0 Certainly that type of pronounced emotional animus
persists in our society today." Nevertheless, this animus-based
characterization does not offer a full portrait of sexual domination
because it obscures the structural or institutional dimensions of
heterosexist domination. 2 Rigid sexuality hierarchies normalize -
and render invisible- heterosexuality; they also stigmatize
nonheterosexual identities and practices. 3 These hierarchies are
constructed in law, politics, social interaction, history, and
economics. 4 While overt manifestations of anti-gay bigotry are
common, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons more often
10. See Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as
Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 149 & nn.103-05 (1992) (describing
"homophobia" as a hatred of gay men and lesbians and referring to literature
discussing the terminology).
11. See James Allon Garland, The Low Road to Violence: Governmental Discrimination
as a Catalyst for Pandemic Hate Crime, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 3-4 (2001) (noting that
antigay violence still exists in states that no longer have laws prohibiting homosexual
intimacy).
12. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 18-20
(1999) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race] (discussing the
structural nature of subordination); see also Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy
Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1467 (1992) (explaining that violence against
lesbians and gays serves as a mode of power for the control of human sexuality).
13. Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 12, at 19 (discussing
the political role of homophobic violence).
14. See id. at 4 ("In a heterosexist society, heterosexuality serves as the
transparent norm that shapes ideology, politics, culture and social relations."); see
also MICHAEL WARNER, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY
xxi (Michael Warner ed., 1993) ("Het[erosexual] culture thinks of itself as the
elemental form of human association, as the very model of inter-gender relations, as
the indivisible basis of all community and as the means of reproduction without
which society wouldn't exist." ).
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suffer from hidden, institutional, and subtle norms that render them
unequal in political, legal, and social contexts.15 The homophobic
label, which implies a conscious and overt bias, obscures the
existence of heterosexism-or institutionalized domination of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals."
By discussing heterosexism, I do not wish to dismiss the
pervasiveness of homophobia: open homophobia remains an obstacle
for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals, both inside
and outside of the legal system. A recent child custody case decided
by the Alabama Supreme Court illustrates the persistence of virulent
homophobia among the nation's jurists. In Ex parte H.H.,"7 the
Alabama Supreme Court sustained a trial court's ruling that declined
to modify a custodial order awarding a father physical custody of his
children over the objection of their lesbian mother.18 The court's
decision rests formally on sterile civil procedure grounds, namely,
that the trial court had a superior knowledge of the evidence and that
the court of appeals improperly re-weighed the evidence on appeal.19
Chief Justice Moore, however, wrote separately and justified the
decision on the grounds that the "mother of the minor children not
only dated another woman, but lived with that woman, shared a bed
with her, and had an intimate physical and sexual relationship with
her., 20 In a colorful, and even more homophobic passage, Chief
Justice Moore argues that the trial court was correct in denying
physical custody to the mother because:
Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent,
immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the
laws of nature and of nature's God upon which this Nation and our
15. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 12, at 10.
16. See Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187, 195 (1988). Law argues that:
In popular culture, opposition to homosexuality is often characterized as
"homophobia." That term suggests a fear of homosexuals and an individual
pathological hatred of them. Although some individuals are indeed
homophobic, heterosexism is a much broader phenomenon, structured into
basic familial, economic and political relationships. Heterosexism shapes
the lives, choices, beliefs and attitudes of millions of people who experience
neither fear nor hatred of gay and lesbian people.
Id. See also Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO.
L.J. 459, 547-49 (1990) (distinguishing homophobia from heterosexism).
17. 2002 WL 227956 (Ala. Feb. 15, 2002).
18. See id. at *14.
19. Id. at *3-*4 (finding that the court of appeals improperly substituted its own
judgment for the wisdom of the trial judge).
20. Id. at *5. (Moore, C.J., concurring).
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laws are predicated. Such conduct violates both the criminal and
civil laws of this State and is destructive to a basic building block of
society- the family. The law of Alabama is not only clear in its
condemning such conduct, but the courts of this State have
consistently held that exposing a child to such behavior has a
destructive and seriously detrimental effect on the children. It is
21
an inherent evil against which children must be protected .
Chief Justice Moore's decision, along with numerous statistical and
anecdotal reviews, demonstrates the presence of homophobia among
• , . . 22
the nation's jurists. Emotional acts of homophobia, however, do not
exist separately from the political and ideological structures that
support them.
One could, however, offer a slightly "positive" reading of the
Alabama decision: eight justices of the Alabama Supreme Court
refused to join in Chief Justice Moore's rant on the perils of
homosexuality and decided the case largely on procedural grounds."
Decades of anti-heterosexist political action has undoubtedly
engendered positive changes in the way judges approach gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender litigants. Perhaps the justices who joined
the lead opinion, unlike Chief Justice Moore, felt uncomfortable
making open expressions of homophobic bias- or even do not
subscribe to such bias.24 Yet, these possibilities should not distract us
too much. As feminist and critical race theorists have painstakingly
demonstrated, the attainment of formal equality under the law does
not translate into complete equality for subordinate groups.25 In fact,
21. Id. (Moore, C.J., concurring).
22. See Rhonda Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799-800 (1979) (offering one of the
earliest and most exhaustive studies of judicial homophobia); see also Patricia J. Falk,
The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of Historical
Context, Justificatory Citation and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 37 n.135
(1994) (asserting that homophobia is rife throughout the legal system); Lawrence
Goldyn, Gratuitous Language in Appellate Cases Involving Gay People: "Queer Baiting" from
the Bench, 3 POL. BEHAV. 31 (1981).
23. Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Nancy Polikoff raised this point during the
symposium. See Symposium, Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias
and its Implications Within the Legal System (Mar. 26, 2002) (transcript on file with the
American University journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law).
24. See Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in
Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 893, 951-69 (1996) (arguing that
judicial decisionmaking is becoming more progressive on gay and lesbian equality
issues).
25. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1384 (1988) (" The
removal of formal barriers, although symbolically significant to some, will do little to
alter the hierarchical relationship between Blacks and whites until the way in which
race consciousness perpetuates norms that legitimate Black subordination is
revealed."); see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
2002]
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"neutral" legal principles can support oppressive social hierarchies.
Anti-heterosexist activists and scholars, therefore, must seek to
illuminate the subtle and institutionalized discriminatory practices
and ideologies that operate to marginalize women, persons of color,
the poor, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons.
II. MULTIDIMENSIONALITY: THE COMPLEX FABRIC OF IDENTITY AND
OPPRESSION
Any effort to portray comprehensively the effects of heterosexism
in the legal system must grapple with the "multidimensional" nature
of subordination." Several gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
theorists have begun to explicate the ways in which race, class,
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1050 (1978) (arguing that antidiscrimination law fails to reach structural forms
of racism).
26. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958).
rJ]udges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before
them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into
consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach.
On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives such
as "arbitrary," "artificial," "normal," "reasonable," "inherent,"
"fundamental," or "essential," whose office usually, though quite
innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation
far more impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in
fact lie behind the decision.
Id. See also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in
Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1152-53 (1993) (" Facially neutral laws
cannot redress most racism, because of the cultural background against which such
laws operate. But even if we could somehow control for this, formally neutral rules
would still fail to redress racism because of certain structural features of the
phenomenon itself."); John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies
Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45
DUKE L.J. 84, 89 (1995) (arguing that the legal realist indeterminacy thesis "implied
that the rules of law could not constrain judges' choices since it was the judges who
chose which rules to apply and how to apply them" and that "since such choices
were necessarily based on the judges' beliefs about what was right, it was the judges'
personal value judgments that consciously or unconsciously formed the basis of their
decisions."); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237
(1989) ("In male supremacist societies, the male standpoint dominates civil society
in the form of the objective standard- that standpoint which, because it dominates
in the world, does not appear to function as a standpoint at all."); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984)
(" Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is not apolitical
and objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial political
choices, but use the ideology of leqal reasoning to make our institutions appear
natural and our rules appear neutral.').
27. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality,"
"Multidimensionality," and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001); see also Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites?,"
supra note 8, at 1360 (claiming that a multidimensional view of racial discrimination
is beneficial to the equality struggle for gay and lesbian equality); Hutchinson, Out
Yet Unseen, supra note 8, at 602 (offering multidimensionality as an alternative to
hegemonic queer theories).
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28gender, and sexuality interact to frame heterosexist discrimination.
The failure of anti-heterosexist scholars and activists to engage
questions of race, class, and gender has led to the articulation of
inadequate and incomplete theories of equality.2 The child custody
paradigm helps to illuminate how heterosexism interacts with
"other" axes of domination. In Bottoms v. Bottoms, 30 for example, the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld an award of custody to a maternal
grandmother over the objection of the mother of the child, who is a
lesbian.3 The United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that biological parents have a fundamental right to the custody and
control of their children.32 Accordingly, courts will grant custody to
28. See Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory:
Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or
Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENy. U. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (1998) (explaining
that the theory of "intersexionality" encompasses the notion of how the intersection
of race, class and gender work in tandem to give rise to heterosexism); Francisco
Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law,
Theory, and Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1294-98 (1997)
(arguing that " heterosexist hegemony" in the normative lifestyle controls
throughout cultural constructs such as law, theory, and politics); Francisco Valdes,
Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-Connectivities, 5 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25, 32-46 (1995) (discussing the impact of gender
upon heterosexism); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1274-80 (1997) (expressing concern that race, class, and gender
are typically viewed as isolated factors, despite the fact that they actually intermingle
and create a nexus of social construction).
29. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
30. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
31. See id. at 108-09.
32. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (explaining that "the
liberty interest at issue in this case- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents."); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (reasoning that "our
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as
a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have
consistently followed that course."); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)
(reiterating that "we have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship
between parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (" It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely
from shifting economic arrangements"'); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) (stating that "the history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (asserting that "it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." ); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (holding that the "liberty of parents
and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of
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third parties over the objection of biological parents only upon a
showing that the parent is "unfit."33  Third parties face an
extraordinarily difficult burden when they seek to satisfy this
standard. 34 Despite the deployment of this heightened standard by
Virginia courts,35 the trial court in Bottoms granted the grandmother's
petition." In homophobic language, the trial court held that Sharon
Bottoms' lesbian status rendered her an unfit parent:
Sharon Bottoms has admitted that she is living in an [sic]
homosexual relationship. She is sharing her bed with her female
lover. Examples given were kissing [and] patting, all of this in the
presence of the child.... I will tell you first that the mother's
conduct is illegal. I will tell you that it is the opinion of the court
that her conduct is immoral. And it is the opinion of this court
that the conduct of Sharon Bottoms renders her an unfit parent.37
children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)
(holding that "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of
parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to control the education
of their own").
33. See Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without a
Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard,
76 N.C. L. REV. 2145, 2145 (1998) (discussing state caselaw finding that the biological
parent's right is paramount unless there is a showing of unfitness); Mark Strasser, Fit
to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 846
(1997) (" At the very least, for custody to be awarded to a third party over a parent, it
must be shown that continued custody with the parent actually would be detrimental
to the child."). As Stresser argues:
Despite near universal judicial testimonials to the child's welfare and best
interest, most states do not apply a pure best interest standard to resolve
custody disputes between biological parents and third parties. Instead, most
states follow the traditional parental rights doctrine. In general, this
doctrine permits an award of custody to a nonparent only if the parent is
shown to be unfit or to have abandoned the child or to have relinquished
custody voluntarily.
Id. at 846-47.
34. See Strasser, supra note 33, at 846-47 (commenting on the difficulty third
parties face when they seek an award of custody over the objection of biological
parents). Strasser argues that:
It is extremely difficult for a nonparent to wrest custody away from a parent.
Because the nonparent 'bears a heavy burden of persuasion,' it may not even
suffice to establish that the parent intentionally abused or neglected the
child. Thus, grandparents, who have no greater claim to custody than other
third parties usually will be unable to establish that they, rather than either
of the parents, should have custody.
Id.
35. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 104 ("In a custody dispute between a parent and
non-parent, 'the law presumes that the child's best interests will be served when in
the custody of its parent."') (quoting Judd v. Van Horn, 81 S.E.2d 432, 436 (Va.
1954)).
36. See id. at 102.
37. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 279 (Va. App. Ct. 1994) (numerous
ellipses omitted)), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
DISSECTING AXES OF SUBORDINATION
The trial judge's homophobia clearly influenced the decision in
Bottomsil Nevertheless, isolating sexuality as the single operative bias
in Bottoms, as many pro-gay and lesbian activists have done, precludes
a richer analysis of the case. Other dimensions of subordination,
particularly class and gender hierarchies, also influenced the
outcome of the case. Only a multidimensional reading can provide a
complete analysis.
In affirming the award of custody to Sharon Bottoms' mother, the
Virginia Supreme Court legitimated the trial court's consideration of
Bottoms' lesbian identity.39 Thus, homophobic bias clearly impacted
the high court's decision. Yet, the court also deployed gender and
class biases. It held that:
She [Sharon Bottoms] moves her residence from place to place,
relying on others for support, and uses welfare funds to 'do' her
fingernails before buying food for the child. She has participated
in illicit relationships with numerous men, acquiring a disease from
one, and 'sleeping' with men in the same room where the child's
crib was located.
40
This portion of the court's ruling demonstrates that broader social
stereotypes, other than homophobia, also influenced the decision in
Bottoms. The court's description of Sharon Bottoms relied upon
social stereotypes that portray poor, single mothers, especially those
who depend upon public assistance to help care for their families, as
"irresponsible" parents.' The court utilized a variety of stereotypes,
including gender, class, and sexuality-based negative imagery, to
justify its ruling.4
38. See Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the Judicial
Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341, 341-43 (1995)
(arguing that the trial court and appellate decisions in Bottoms reflect judicial
homophobia); see also Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee:" Bottoms v.
Bottoms and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
289, 289-90 (1994) (criticizing the trial court decision in Bottoms).
39. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (" Conduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable
as a Class 6 felony in the Commonwealth; thus, that conduct is another important
consideration in determining custody.").
40. Id.
41. See Linda McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 345
(1996) (discussing stigmatization of poor and teenage parents); see also Martha A.
Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274, 285-86 (arguing
that contemporary social theorists "construct single motherhood as dangerous and
even deadly, not only to the single mothers and their children, but to society as a
whole"); Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 25 (1993) ("Underlying the current campaign against poor single
mothers is the image of the lazy welfare mother who breeds children at the expense
of taxpayers in order to increase the amount of her welfare check. In society's mind,
that mother is Black.").
42. See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 8, at 595 (exploring the gender
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In order to describe and counter anti-lesbian bias, scholars and
activists must recognize the multidimensional nature of
subordination." Not only do advocates of gay and lesbian equality
often fail to analyze the complexity of subordination, their works
might actually reinforce systems of domination. Several prominent
proponents of same-sex marriages, for example, have explicitly
argued that two-parent marital households provide superior living
environments for children." These proponents contend that
marriage "civilizes" gay men by dampening their presumably
"promiscuous" passions." These arguments legitimate a conservative
discourse that stigmatizes poor women, especially poor women of
46
color, who are parents outside of the construct of marriage.
Heterosexist jurists have also invoked racial, gender, and class
stereotypes to deny equal protection to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender litigants.47 These courts have deployed a "special rights"
rhetoric, which portrays gays and lesbians as wealthy, well-educated,
and politically powerful. 4' The special rights discourse compares gays
and lesbians with persons of color and finds that the former are too
distinct from the latter to qualify for civil rights protection.4 9 In the
context of constitutional law, this "gay as privileged" stereotype has
resulted in a denial of heightened scrutiny of gay and lesbian equal
and class dimensions of Bottoms).
43. See Mary Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward
Lesbian Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 183, 187 (1994) (arguing
that "the project of theorizing lesbian inequality requires a contextualized
understanding of how gender and sexual orientation, as well as such other markers
as race, class and ability, interact to figure differently identified lesbians at different
locations in a complex matrix of subordinating systems differently").
44. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 112-13 (1996) (arguing that children raised in gay
and lesbian households are just as socially and psychologically adjusted as children
raised in different-sex or single-parent households); see also ANDREW SULLIVAN,
VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1995).
45. See Eskridge, supra note 44, at 83-84 (recognizing the argument that lesbians,
unlike gay men, have achieved a balance of sexual freedom and interpersonal
commitment more easily). But see Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 8, at 594
(critiquing this view, specifically with regard to the stigmatizing effect on gay men
and gay male sexuality).
46. See sources cited supra note 41.
47. See generally Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites," supra note 8, at 1378-82
(discussing courts' stereotypical treatment of gay and lesbian equal protection
plaintiffs)
48. See id. at 1372-75 (discussing the "special rights" rhetoric).
49. See id. at 1372-73 (discussing the comparative dimension of "special rights"
discourse); see also Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 291-92 (1994) (critiquing the
search for sameness in equality debates).
DISSECTING AXES OF SUBORDINATION
protection claims.5" Several federal courts of appeals and other
tribunals have held that gays and lesbians possess too much political
power to qualify for judicial solicitude; these courts have then upheld
anti-gay discriminatory practices.1  In Romer v. Evans,52 a majority of
the Supreme Court evaded the opportunity to address the issue of
heightened scrutiny of heterosexist policies; instead, it invalidated
Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution on "rational basis"
grounds." Amendment 2 made it illegal for the state or any of its
subdivisions to implement laws or policies that protect gay and
.... 54
lesbian individuals from discrimination. As I have analyzed
elsewhere, however, Justice Scalia's dissent addressed the heightened
scrutiny question and vividly portrayed the special rights rhetoric.
55
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
argued that "those who engage in homosexual conduct ... have high
disposable income ... [and] possess political power much greater
than their numbers both locally and statewide," and they use this
power to achieve "full social acceptance of homosexuality." 5 6 At least
three justices of the Supreme Court were prepared to join several
courts of appeals and utilize a race and class-conscious rhetoric to
deny equal protection to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
litigants. It is imperative, therefore, that anti-heterosexist advocates
begin to dissect the different axes of oppression and identity that
emerge in juridical discourse and to consider how these strands of
subordination operate to the detriment of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender litigants.
50. See Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites," supra note 8, at 1378-82
(discussing the deployment of "special rights" discourse in equal protection
jurisprudence).
51. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearing Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that "homosexuals are not without political power; they
have the ability to and do attract the attention of lawmakers"); see also Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing magazine and newspaper articles
and cocnluding that "homosexuals are not without political power"); Dean v. District
of Columbia, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that " [g]ays and
lesbians are . . . a political force that any elective officeholder may ignore only at his
or her peril"), aff d, 653 A.2d 307 (1995).
52. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a constitutional amendment prohibiting all
legislative, executive, and judicial action designed to protect gays, lesbians and
bisexuals from discrimination).
53. See id. at 635 (holding that Amendment 2 fails rational basis review).
54. See id. at 624 (discussing the requirements of the amendment).
55. See Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites," supra note 8, at 1381-82
(critiquing Justice Scalia's dissnet in Romer).
56. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46.
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CONCLUSION
This symposium has provided the space to explore compelling
legal, social, and political problems. Judicial heterosexism potentially
affects all gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals involved
in the court system; judicial heterosexism is also a product of broader
societal heteronormativity. In their quest to understand and respond
to judicial heterosexism, scholars must not only recognize its
institutional nature, but must also treat it as an institution with
multiple dimensions: heterosexism is irreversibly intertwined with
racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other forms of domination.
By incorporating these insights into their analyses, legal scholars can
engage in a more contextualized response to the problem of judicial
bias.
